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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine abnormal wealth effects observed by acquirer and target
shareholders in technology-sector M&A deals, as well as the effect that liquidity positioning has
on merger premiums or discounts. Abnormal wealth effects experienced by the acquirer and target
both pre- and post-merger announcement were tested in a two-sided event study consisting of a
large sample of companies representing the two sides of the transaction. The event study
demonstrates that different characteristics of M&A deals, i.e. payment consideration and
domesticity, have asymmetric effects on abnormal wealth effects for shareholders of both parties,
with the most dramatic effects manifesting in high abnormal returns prior-to, and after acquisition
announcement dates for targets. It is concluded that the liquidity ratios such as current assets to
current liabilities and cash as a percentage of total assets has no significant effect on merger
premiums while the solvency measure of total assets to total liabilities has a significantly negative
effect on merger premiums for both bidders and targets.
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Role of Liquidity in Technology Sector Mergers
& Acquisitions
Introduction
As society progresses through the 21 century, technological development has cemented
st

itself as one of the most crucial catalysts for economic and societal growth. Less than a half-century
ago, this was not the case. In the 20-year period from 1970-1990, there were a total number of 17
United States M&A deals recorded in which either the buyer or the target (or both) were in the
technological sector. This number represents less than one deal per year in that 20-year period.
Contrast this to the 3-year period from 1999-2001, in which there were 1,798 deals, more than 100
times as many. Especially relative to other industries, this growth is explosive, the trend persists,
and implications are not limited only to the number of mergers observed. According to an analysis
by Hathaway (2017), from 1980 to 2015, the technology sector grew from 0.8% of total GDP to
5.2%. In Q1 of 2018, there were $60 billion worth of technology sector mergers and acquisitions,
with just four deals making up half of that number.
What role does liquidity risk play in these mergers and acquisitions? After a review of the
literature, it has become clear that while there is some relevant research regarding technology
sector mergers and acquisitions present, a deeper examination of the drivers of these deals as
related to liquidity position in the technology sector is critical. This paper will examine the effect
that the liquidity position of the target company and the acquiring company has on the
characteristics of a M&A deal. These characteristics include success rate, merger
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premiums/discounts, payment type, and financial performance subsequent to the transaction. This
study will first conduct an event study analysis to examine the wealth effects of mergers and
acquisitions in the technology sector and then look at the role of liquidity in determining the merger
premiums of the deals. Specifically, this paper will look at 77 deals spanning the 10-year period
from 2008-2018. Using the event study methodology, the abnormal returns accruing to bidder and
target for shareholders respectively around the announcement date of the acquisition will first be
analyzed. Subsamples such as cash versus non-cash deals, and domestic versus cross-border
transactions will also be examined. Finally, using Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis, the
role of alternate measures of liquidity on determining the merger premium will be analyzed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II will discuss the relevant literature
leading up to the hypotheses presented in section III. Section IV describes the data and
methodology; section V presents the analysis and results while section VI summarizes the key
findings and discusses the conclusions.
Completed (successful) deals will be examined along with unsuccessful deals to determine
whether the liquidity positioning of the two parties plays a role, and if so, what that role is. Due to
constraints on gathering information, mergers or acquisitions in which both parties are privately
funded will not be included in the analysis.

Literature Review
1. Mergers and Acquisitions as Related to Liquidity
When considering a merger or acquisition, various factors must be taken into consideration.
Among these factors is liquidity positioning (Officer, 2007). Without sufficient liquidity, a
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business cannot function. General liquidity is a large factor in the purpose, pricing, and success
of mergers and acquisitions (Officer, 2007). Likewise, mergers and acquisitions have an effect on
the liquidity of both the bidder and the target company after a deal has occurred or been attempted
(Carletti, Hartmann, and Spagnolo, 2007). Officer (2007) examines the causes of acquisition
discounts for unlisted targets that are subsidiaries of other firms. His study compared these unlisted
targets to similar publicly-traded traded targets. His findings were consistent with those of prior
studies. Liquidity positioning of both parties is a large factor that is taken into consideration when
pricing these deals. The liquidity provided by the buyer specifically is of utmost importance. Often,
a buyout is not the only possible course of action to raise funds. Among the most common ways
for businesses to raise capital is through debt. It has been demonstrated, however, that when the
cost of debt is expensive, an acquisition discount is more likely to occur for the bidding company
( Officer 2007).
Liquidity risk of both the bidding company and the target also affects specific characteristics
of the merger or acquisition taking place (Lipson and Mortal, 2007). Through an examination of
the change in liquidity, and how they affect merger and acquisition characteristics, Lipson and
Mortal (2007) found that the spread associated with these deals decrease as volume, number of
analysts, number of shareholders, firms size, and volume increase. Spreads increase as volatility
increase. Luypaert and Caneghem (2017) suggest this is because information is more readily
available, and asymmetry is lower, leading to more accurate gauges of value by both parties to the
deal. Lipson and Mortal (2007) conclude that diversifying and non diversifying mergers do not
affect liquidity differently. In the sample, 47% of the deals were financed with stock, and less than
25% with cash.
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Lack of adequate liquidity can be, and often is, a source of financial distress for any firm. This
can lead to an acquisition by a stronger firm, even if no synergies are created with the deal
(Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth, 2011). The objective of this study was to investigate the
relationship between corporate liquidity positioning and the opportunity for reallocation of assets.
The data show, according to the authors, that firms that lack liquidity or are in financial distress
are often acquired by firms with a strong liquidity position, regardless of whether or not synergies
are created. Mark and Lipson (2007) refer to this as a “liquid acquisition” and find it to be a more
economically efficient allocation of assets as opposed to a termination without merger. As a result
of the fact that industry-specific assets may be more difficult to sell or transfer efficiently outside
of that specific industry, they concluded that liquidity mergers are more likely to occur in sectors
where assets are more industry-specific. They conclude that credit lines are used more often than
cash as a form of payment in industries where these mergers are more likely to occur. A sample of
over 1,000 same-industry mergers were examined using the Securities Data Company (SDC)
database from 1980-2006.

2.

Other Factors Affecting M&A Deals
Other factors can either work in tandem with, or counteract the effect that liquidity has on

M&A deals. Other factors can also affect certain characteristics of corporate M&As, including the
type of payment, and gain accruing to the bidding firm post-merger. Luypaert and Caneghem
(2017) examined the effects that risk factors, information asymmetry and uncertainty have on the
type of payment and subsequent realized value the bidder. Luypaert and Caneghem (2017) used a
large sample of bidding companies and both public and private targets. M&A data between two
publicly-quoted US firms from 1994-2011 was obtained from the Thomson Financial SDC
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Platinum Database, and accounting and stock price data through CRSP and Compustat. Only deals
in which the acquirer is receiving >50% share of the target and does not already control >=50% of
the target were captured. Consistent with past literature, analyst and media coverage are used as
a proxy for information asymmetry, collected through the I/B/E/S and Factiva databases. Relative
size based on a natural logarithm of total assets was also used. To measure uncertainty, the implied
volatility of 91-day ATM options were used with idiosyncratic return volatility. Binary probit,
logit, and ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regressions were employed to analyze the data. Deals in
which there is higher uncertainty are more likely to be paid for with stock. This is because the risk
is shared with the shareholders. Deals in which there is more information asymmetry for the target
are more likely to be settled with cash. Converse to M&As settled with cash, this results in a higher
realized return for the bidding company because gains are not shared with target shareholders.
Other factors that affect the success and structure of M&A deals are target location (Caiazza,
Clare, and Pozzolo, 2012), growth potential and risk (Hagendorff, 2012), and age of the target
(Raggozino, 2006). With regard to potential risk, Hagendorff (2012) concludes that acquiring
banks pay more for profitable, high-growth, and low-risk target banks. Liquidity risk therefore
may also play a role in the search for a viable target by the acquirer.
Target age affects the success of M&A performance (Raggozino, 2006). The study performed
by Raggozino provides context as to the differences that new firms and established firms
experience with M&A outcomes. The unique attributes that new companies have may affect the
success found with a merger or acquisition. The study draws from a sample of high-tech firms
only and concludes that new firms have poor performance relative to established firms when the
target is young; however, they outperform established firms when the target is privately-held. It is

6

concluded that the reason for this is that challenges that new firms face directly affect M&A
performance. One challenge that new firms face is obtaining sufficient liquidity.

3.

Technology-Specific M&A Performance
Currently, the vast majority of Information Technology sector M&A deals are US-US deals

(Inkpen, Sundaram, and Rockwood, 2000). Inkpen, Sundaram, and Rockwood, (2000) examined
M&A deals in which the acquirers are not in the US, acquiring US assets. The vast majority of
Tech M&As have both parties in the US; at the time of their study, they make up over 90%. As a
result, the authors believed more work needed to be done studying the relatively small number of
cross-border deals. Even though the number is small, cross-border acquisitions where the US
firms are the target made up $250b worth in the 1990s. The study focuses primarily on European
acquisitions of Silicon-valley-like targets. The integration and governance of the acquired firms
were analyzed as well. It is concluded that European firms struggle with such acquisitions.

Hypotheses
First, the event study related hypotheses are presented. Then we present the hypotheses
specific to the impact of bidder and target liquidity on merger premiums.
H1: Null: Bidding firm shareholders do NOT earn any abnormal returns on the
announcement of a merger in the technology sector.
H1: Alt: Bidding firm shareholders do earn abnormal returns on the announcement of a
merger in the technology sector.
H2: Null: Target firm shareholders do NOT earn any abnormal returns on the
announcement of a merger in the technology sector.
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H2: Alt: Target firm shareholders do earn abnormal returns on the announcement of a
merger in technology sector.
H3: Null: There is no difference in the abnormal returns accruing to bidding firm
shareholders between deals paid by cash versus non-cash.
H3: Alt: There is a difference in the abnormal returns accruing to bidding firm shareholders
between deals paid by cash versus non-cash.
H4: Null: There is no difference in the abnormal returns accruing to target firm
shareholders between deals paid by cash versus non-cash.
H4: Alt: There is a difference in the abnormal returns accruing to target firm shareholders
between deals paid by cash versus non-cash.
H5: Null: There is no difference in the abnormal returns accruing to bidding firm
shareholders between domestic versus cross-border deals
H5: Alt: There is a difference in the abnormal returns accruing to bidding firm shareholders
between domestic versus cross-border deals
H6: Null: There is no difference in the abnormal returns accruing to target firm
shareholders between domestic versus cross-border deals
H6: Alt: There is a difference in the abnormal returns accruing to target firm shareholders
between domestic versus cross-border deals

H7: Null: Target liquidity positioning does not play a role in technology sector mergers
and acquisitions.
H7: Alt: Target liquidity does play a role in technology sector mergers and acquisitions.
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H8: Null: Bidder liquidity positioning does not play a role in technology sector mergers
and acquisitions.
H8: Alt : Bidder liquidity does play a role in technology sector mergers and acquisitions.
2

If it is found that liquidity positioning of the target or the bidder (or both) does in fact affect
the characteristics of technology sector mergers and acquisitions, then the null hypotheses will be
rejected. After determining whether liquidity positioning affects the characteristics of technologysector M&As, the effect of liquidity on merger premiums will be studied.

Data and Methodology
1. Data Description
Data from 16,807 technology sector mergers were collected from Bloomberg, ranging from
1970 through the first quarter of 2018. Due to the nature of the data publicly available, deals in
which both the buyer and the seller are private entities were not captured in the sample. Other
filters used were sector and country of both the bidder and target. Transactions in which both
parties are not categorized as being in the technology sector were not captured in the sample. In
addition, M&As in which both parties to the deal were outside the United States were not selected
as part of the sample. This study does not exclude terminated mergers. This is because survivorship
bias will be nonexistent, and the causes of termination can be further examined. Other
characteristics of the deals were captured including the date of announcement, the ticker of both
parties to the transaction, the seller (if applicable), TV/EBITDA, current premium, Committee on
Uniform Securities Identification Procedures ID (CUSIP) of both parties, value of the deal,
termination fee by acquirer (if applicable), the sector of both parties, and the country of both
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parties. The means of financing each transaction has been gathered and analyzed as it relates to the
role of liquidity positioning in each deal.
Financial information is retrieved from the Compustat database through Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS). This information is used to determine the liquidity position of both the
target and acquirer. Eventus is used as well to determine financial performance before and after
the merger.
2. Variables Used to Measure Liquidity Positioning
Common liquidity ratios will be used to gauge the liquidity position of the target and
bidding company. The two ratios used are: (1) Cash as a percentage of Total Assets and (2) Current
Assets to Current Liabilities, also known as the “current ratio”, shows the ability of the firm to
meet its short-term obligations with cash or quickly-convertible assets. Total Assets to Total
Liabilities, showing the firm’s ability to remain going concern, and continue to operating for
adequate time to meet its commitments and goals, was also added to the study to determine
significance. It can be assumed that companies demonstrating high liquidity ratios are not in
financial distress, where as those with lower ratios are assumed to have poor performance from a
liquidity standpoint. These ratios are a sufficient way of judging the adequacy of the firm’s liquid
position without the need to pursue nonpublic information or build complicated liquidity models.
3. Variables Used to Measure Wealth Effects of Stockholders from the Merger
Announcement
The financial performance of the firm after the merger announcement is also of utmost
importance to determine either the short-term abnormal returns derived from the market perception
of a specific merger, or lack thereof. The effect on stock price in the days preceding and succeeding
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the announcement of the merger is employed to measure the wealth effects derived by the
stockholders.
4. Control Variables
For the event study, relative size of the firms in each transaction was used to control for
the size of the merger premium and relative liquidity position between the two parties. In addition,
firm size is a good proxy for age, as older, more established firms are closely correlated with size.
The actual control variable is size of the bidding firm as a fraction of the aggregate size of both
the bidder and target, with total assets of each firm representing size.
5. Methodology, Event Study
To test the wealth effects experienced by shareholders of the parties to each transaction, a
bilateral event study was performed using the Eventus database. From the sample of 16,807
transactions, the data were trimmed to match the various criteria being tested. These criteria were:
(1) general performance of bidders and targets with no filters, (2) abnormal returns of cash versus
non-cash considerations to finance the acquisition, and (3) differences in abnormal returns derived
from domestic versus cross-border acquisitions. Given these three separate characteristics of the
transactions, the sample size varied based on available data. Data was also limited due to the fact
that the required input file for each query must contain a CUSIP and a date so that the timing
windows and correct security could be matched.
The market index and benchmark option is CRSP value-weighted, however each iteration
of the basic event study was run as CRSP Equally-Weighted and CRSP Equally-Weighted +ValueWeighted as well to ensure that results were consistent. An end-before event date of t-50 was used,
with t=0 being the announcement date. A one-month minimum estimation date of 30 days was
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used, in addition to a 200-day maximum. An ordinary-least-squares estimation method was
applied.
An event period of one month preceding and succeeding the merger announcement date
was employed. To mirror the study by Luypaert and Caneghem (2017), the windows for abnormal
returns were (0,0) (-1,0) (-1,1) (-5,5) (-10,10). The test used was two-tailed.
6. Methodology, Regression Analysis
To determine the relationship between the liquidity positioning of the firms and the merger
premium/discount observed, STATA was used to regress the variables. When the sample was
trimmed to only transactions in which all necessary variables are known, there were 77 transactions
remaining. The dependent variable was represented by the merger premium, while the three
liquidity ratios, Cash to Total Assets, Current Ratio, and Total Assets to Liabilities, were the
independent variables. The relative size control was also introduced.
Empirical Results
1. Event Study
For the general event study with no filters, acquirers (Table 1A) saw statistically
significant abnormal returns of 0.17% on average on the day of the announcement, while targets
(Table 1B) saw strongly significant positive abnormal returns starting from t-7 to t+1. On the day
of the announcement, an average of 18.31% abnormal return was achieved.
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Table 1A

Table 1B
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For non-cash versus cash considerations, acquirers saw a mildly significant .31% abnormal
return on day 0 for transactions announced to be paid for with cash, while noncash considerations
had no significant abnormal return. Abnormal returns for acquirers are illustrated in Table 2A.
This trend is similar for targets. While both cash and noncash considerations showed significant
abnormal returns even before the announcement date, cash payment resulted in an average
abnormal return on day 0 of 22% compared to 13% for noncash, as shown in Table 2B.

Table 2A

Table 2B
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Finally, for acquirers (Table 3A), domestic acquisitions showed mildly significant
abnormal returns of .04% on day zero, and no significant abnormal returns for cross-border
acquisitions. Targets (Table 3B) had very similar significant abnormal returns for domestic and
cross-border deals at 19.31% and 19.47% respectively, with significantly high abnormal returns
leading up to the announcement date for domestic deals only.

Table 3A

Table 3B
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2. Liquidity and Merger Premiums
For Cash/Total Assets and the Current Ratio, there was no statistically significant
relationship between liquidity and merger premiums for both targets and acquirers. However, for
Total Assets/Total Liabilities, the relationship between the ratio and merger premiums was
significantly negative for both parties. This relationship among the variables is shown in the matrix
below (Table 5).

Table 5
Conclusions
The event study data show results that are consistent with existing literature: In general,
bidders will have significant but low or zero abnormal returns upon announcement of an
acquisition. Target shareholders are observed to have high abnormal returns, not only on the
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announcement day, but also on multiple days preceding the announcement. The nature of these
returns is also consistent with what one would expect, not only intuitively, but also after reviewing
literature on the topic for sectors other than technology. The reasoning behind the positive
abnormal wealth effects experienced by target shareholders is that because the company is being
bought out, it is generally perceived as a good sign by market participants, leading to more buying
and a higher stock price. Another reason may be the fact that because target share prices have
historically done well amid an acquisition, market participants may buy in to the stock in hopes of
capitalizing on the expected increase. The large abnormal gains preceding the announcement date
are likely due to information leakage as described by Luypaert and Caneghem (2017) in their
research regarding information asymmetry and uncertainty in mergers and acquisitions. When
news breaks, speculation happens, or information is otherwise leaked in the days leading up to an
acquisition, market participants will try to acquire shares early to capitalize on expected gains.
The asymmetric effect of a merger announcement when analyzed by payment
consideration is also explained by the actions of market participants. Higher abnormal returns are
observed when the acquirer is financing the deal strictly with cash, as opposed to a payment
structure consisting of non-cash consideration, or more than one form of payment. There is less
uncertainty when cash is used, which leads to higher returns.
The most striking asymmetric results are found in the abnormal returns of domestic versus
cross-border acquisition target shareholders. While cross-border target stock prices do show
significant and high positive returns on announcement day, and significant returns on the day
immediately prior domestic targets see significant positive returns as far back as four days prior to
announcement. This demonstrates that shareholders are more keen to information regarding an
expected transaction in domestic deals (U.S. to U.S.) as opposed to cross-border deals. This once
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again affirms the notion that information leakage is the cause of abnormal wealth effects prior to
announcement because information would be more readily-available in domestic acquisitions.
Regarding liquidity in merger premiums, no significant correlation was observed between
the two liquidity measures used (current ratio and cash/total assets). For both targets and acquirers,
there was a significant negative relationship between total assets/total liabilities and merger
premiums. This means that the more assets a firm has relative to its liabilities, whether it be target
or acquirer, the lower a premium was found.
While the fact that this study was limited in scope allowed more focus on certain aspects,
others still require more research. Due to data limitations regarding public information found, the
liquidity ratios and solvency ratio do not necessarily display the whole financial health of the firms
being examined. If more data can be found, better proxies or models for liquidity can be examined.
There is also room to explore other variables with possible asymmetric effects on abnormal wealth
affects in light of an acquisition. One example is public versus nonpublic targets or acquirers. Due
to various data constraints, this could not be tested in this paper, however it leaves a door open for
further study.
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